

## Guide to the Essays

The essays collected in this book are all concerned with the role of emotions in philosophical epistemology. In the opening paper, *Georg Brun* and *Dominique Kuenzle* offer a survey of theories of emotions and developments in epistemology in order to determine what epistemological relevance can, and has been, assigned to emotions.

Catherine Elgin and Christopher Hookway were among the first epistemologists to argue that emotions contribute to our epistemic success. In her contribution to this collection, *Catherine Elgin* analyses epistemic functions of emotions, drawing attention to parallels and differences between emotions on the one hand, and perceptions and beliefs on the other. She argues that, like perceptions, emotions deliver representations of various kinds of facts and, like beliefs, emotions act as sources of salience.

According to *Christopher Hookway*, emotions can play part in the acquisition of beliefs that are epistemically immediate in the sense that their justification does not depend on consciously accessible reasons. Focusing on doubt, Hookway shows how the distinction between ‘felt’ doubts and idle ‘paper doubts’ can serve internalist purposes, insofar as epistemic subjects ought to act on felt doubts only. The insight of externalism is that affective evaluations, such as felt doubt, need not be accessible to reflection.

*Alessandra Tanesini* invokes emotions to develop a version of fallibilism that is based on humility as an intellectual virtue. Several accounts of fallibilism are examined and rejected before intellectual humility is introduced and characterized partly by appeal to salience generating properties of emotions. The resulting account of fallibilism is then shown to meet the criteria of adequacy rivaling theories fail to meet.

The following two essays approach from a different angle, and in more detail, the analogy between emotions and perceptions, as well as epistemic immediacy. *Sabine A. Döring* analyses and utilizes the similarity of the epistemic deliverances of emotions and perceptions. She develops the view that differences in content and attitude make it possible that there can be conflicts between beliefs and emotions with respect to the

question of how they represent the world, even though such a conflict does not amount to logical inconsistency.

*Daniel Dohrn* focuses on Hookway's work on epistemic immediacy. He argues that while epistemic immediacy may be relevant for knowledge acquisition, emotions cannot justify such knowledge. This argument is based on a preference for 'Cartesian' epistemologies stressing the relevance of reflective assessment, as opposed to epistemologies that emphasize the role of immediate affective valuations.

*Markus Wild* offers another critical assessment of emotions' role in epistemology. He claims that emotions should neither be conceived as advancing knowledge by tracking salience, nor should they be seen as regulating inquiry. The problems that prevent emotions from performing these epistemic functions are not solved, but only replaced by new problems, if we invoke epistemic virtues. Wild ends by making room for a more modest version of affective epistemology.

Even if the epistemic yield of emotions is acknowledged in principle, we must not forget that emotions may still 'skew the epistemic landscape'. *Peter Goldie* diagnoses an overly optimistic trend in recent epistemological theorizing about the emotions, which he sees as fuelled by their role in the 'fast and frugal heuristics' of our bounded rationality. Starting with Hume's proposed corrections of aspects of moral emotions, Goldie draws attention to how emotions can systematically mislead us. He explains this by appeal to environmental mismatch; emotion-based heuristics have emerged in specific environments, some of which have changed.

*Paul Thagard* assimilates emotions to beliefs and desires by conceiving of all these states and processes as patterns of neural activities. He starts with an argument against propositional attitudes, which hinges on the claim that inference to the best explanation can never appeal to abstract objects. Thagard then presents an account of the neurophysiological interconnections between cognition and emotion that allows for emotions to frequently contribute to the growth of knowledge.

In the final paper of this collection, *Ronald de Sousa* focuses on specifically epistemic feelings, which he classifies according to their object and the phase of knowledge

acquisition in which they occur. A sample of experimental findings shows firstly how such feelings interact in various ways with other cognitive functions and secondly the important role they play in bridging different systems of mental processing.

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